Chinese state-run media and pro-Beijing actors have been publishing disinformation narratives on various platforms in what was likely a “coordinated influence operation” targeting Chinese-Canadian voters in the 2021 Canadian federal election, says an organization specializing in exposing disinformation.
DisinfoWatch, a Canadian platform that monitors and exposes foreign disinformation activities in the country, reported in September that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its affiliated entities have targeted Chinese-Canadian voters and federal candidates from the Conservative Party during the 2021 federal election.
“After analysing available open-source data and consulting with key stakeholders, we believe that the timing and content of narratives indicate the likelihood of a coordinated influence operation targeting Chinese-Canadian voters,” the group said in a recent news release, co-authored by Marcus Kolga, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and Ai-Men Lau, communications officer at the Canadian think tank.
“ objective of this false narrative was to incite fear and anger towards the candidate and the Conservative Party in targeted communities. ultimate impact of these and other influence operations targeting the Conservatives is difficult to measure, though voter influence and conversion remains the likely goal.”
Those pro-Beijing actors spread disinformation narratives on various media platforms, including CCP mouthpiece Global Pezou, the WeChat app, and local Chinese-Canadian websites, the authors said.
One example the authors gave was a Global Pezou article published on Sept. 9, 2021, that condemned the Conservative Party’s platform, particularly the foreign policies related to the CCP. article also threatened Canadians of retaliation from China should they elect a Conservative government.
authors noted that despite the outlet’s small audience in Canada, the article allows the Chinese regime to “set the tone for domestic Canadian platforms and actors” who would “actively support far-left and far-right illiberalism and authoritarians” and spread CCP propaganda and disinformation domestically.
DisinfoWatch noted that the motivation of the Chinese regime’s disinformation campaign was likely a way for it to deflect criticism of its authoritarian rule and protect its interests.
“When faced with criticism from governments, media, or activists abroad, the Chinese government often deploys tactical counter-narratives that aim to discredit and undermine them,” the authors said.
Conservative Party’s election platform was filled with policy proposals to hold the Chinese regime and CCP officials accountable for human rights violations. It also included proposals to diversify trade away from China, ban Huawei from Canada’s next-generation telecom infrastructure, and remove Chinese state media from Canada’s cable networks.
‘Pink Attack Mode’
Following the Global Pezou article, a post that included disinformation regarding Conservative candidate Kenny Chiu emerged on the Chinese state-controlled chat app WeChat and its Chinese version, Weixin.
“While state media were used to directly attack the Conservative Party leadership and platform, certainly on the orders of government leadership, narratives that targeted specific candidates appear to have been less organized and more-bottom up,” Kolga and Lau said.
post blasted Chiu for introducing a private member bill, Bill C-282, aimed at establishing a “foreign influence registry,” which obligates individuals or organizations acting on behalf of a foreign government to register themselves with the Canadian federal government.
While the bill was not directed at any specific country or ethnic community, the post alleged that Chiu was attempting to “suppress the Chinese community,” and that the foreign registry would restrict Chinese-Canadian economic, cultural, and technological exchanges. It further accused that the bill may repress Chinese diasporas’ freedom of speech.
In a previous interview with Pezou, Chiu said he had shared the experience of being targeted for misinformation with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, but he said the agency wouldn’t confirm or deny whether it’s pursuing an investigation on the matter.
WeChat post targeting Chiu is an example of a common CCP disinformation attack mode, dubbed as the “Pink Attack Mode” by Doublethink Lab, a leading disinformation analysis NGO in Taiwan. This mode involves local pro-Beijing “netizens” in China and Canada who help spread CCP propaganda and disinformation online.
authors noted that an estimated 1 million Canadians use the WeChat app, which means that content shared on the platform “has the potential to reach a large audience.” Combining Facebook, private messaging, and a payment system, WeChat is the third most popular social media platform in the world, with nearly 1.25 billion users.
Timing and Impact
Examining the timing of the release of the Global Pezou’ Sept. 9 article, Kolga and Lau said it was likely published in response to the Conservative Party’s surge in the polls around the time.
When Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau called the federal election on Aug. 15, the Liberal Party polled at roughly 35 percent and was projected to win at least a strong minority. By the end of August, support for the Liberal Party dropped to around 32 percent, while that of the Conservative Party rose to the same level in public popularity.
disinformation narrative circulated on WeChat targeting Conservative candidate Kenny Chiu also corresponds to this timeline, the authors said.
While it is difficult to measure the actual impact of CCP disinformation on the 2021 Canadian federal election, the authors pointed to the polling data collected by 338canada.com, which was incorrect by a nearly 10 percent margin in their projection of Chiu winning in the Steveston-Richmond East riding.
“It should be noted that while these polling results suggest a dramatic swing, it does not rule out that polling may simply be inaccurate,” the authors said. “However, the gap between polling and election results is unusual due to how rapidly the swing between a Conservative to Liberal candidate occurred.”
Kolga and Lau said the Canadian government should examine third-language media in the country to understand how these platforms were used to spread disinformation and misinformation.
“ Chinese government has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to advance its interest in Canada by directly manipulating Canadian political debate and policy through the use of disinformation, threats, intimidation, and influence operations directed at Canadian diaspora groups,” Kolga and Lau said.
“Such interference threatens to undermine the integrity of Canadian democracy and erode public trust in our democratic processes and institutions,” they said.
Pezou : CCP’s Disinformation Operation Interfered in Canada’s 2021 Federal Election: Report